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MONEY AND PRICES INTHE PHILIPPINES,
1981-1992:A COINTEGRATIONANALYSIS
Celia M. Reyes and Josef T.Yap*
INTRODUCTION
The design of rules and formulationof discretionaryaction
governingmonetarypolicyis oneissue that concerns economic
managers.InthePhilippines, themonetaryauthorities donotreveal
the actualpolicies theypursueandthismakesitdifficult toevaluate
their actions. Hypothesesregarding the optimalityof policy cannot
be tested unless the policy is adequately described.
A matter of great interest is the relationship between the price
level and a monetary aggregate since the former is one possible
variable on which to anchor the money policy.Apart from the issue
of which monetary aggregate isthe appropriate link,the direction of
causality must be investigated. This will determine whether the
Central Bank, by controlling the money supply, has indee_
influenced the price level. Such a situation can be supported by
empirical evidencethat indicates a causality running from moneyto
prices. A reverse causality, on the other hand, means that the
Central Bank has been accommodating price increases.
This study islargely basedonthe workof Funke and Hall(1992)
which, in turn, arises from two developments in the econometric
literature: the first is the P*framework stemming from the work of
Hallman et al. (1989, 1991) and used in a major international study
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by Hoellerand Poret(1991) and the second isthe development of a
set of newtechniques in multivariatecointegration analysis due to
Johansen (1988, 1991). By investigating the relationship between
moneyand pricelevel, Funkeand Hallsoughtto determine whether
there isa fundamental difference in the conduct of monetary policy
between Germany and other countries, specifically the US and the
UK.This analysis has important repercussions on the drivetowards
a European Monetary Union.
The present study has limitations similar to a recent one by
Gochoco (1992), which seeks to determine whether monetary
authorities in the Philippines effectively pursued an exchange rate
peg or not by comparing the volatilities of money aggregates and
the exchange rate.Herstudy doesnot addressthe issue of whether
such a policy is optimal or not.Similarly,while this study describes
the relationship between money and prices, it does not attempt to
evaluate whether the actions of the Central Bank that led to this
outcume havebeen optimal.The design of optimal monetary policy
whether it be in the form of rulesor discretion could be analyzed in
future studies using a framework such as that of Frankel (1993).
Section II presents the general statistical and theoretical
framework on which we base our discussion. Section III then
examines the empirical evidence with emphasis onthe direction of
causality within the system.The last section highlights institutional
features of the Philippine economy, especially with regard to
monetary policy,that mayhavegiven riseto the resultspresented in
the previous section,
THE ECONOMIC ANDSTATISTICALFRAMEWORK
Ouranalysisofthe relationship betweenmoneyand pricelevel
beginswitha briefexposition ofthe P* approach,whichisbasedon
thesimplequantityequation:
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where Q isthe real GNP,Pis the GNP pricedeflator, Mis the stock
of money and V is the velocity of money. From this equation,
Hallman et al. (1989, 1991) haverecently developed an indicator of
the long-term relationship between the money stock M and price
level P,which has become known as the P* (P-star) concePt.This
long-run equilibrium price level, P*, is defined as the price level
consistent with the currentvalueof M,the long-runequilibrium value
of velocity (V*), and the currentvalue of potential real GNP (Q*):
P*= MV (2)
Q
The long-run price level P* can then be compared with the
actual price level P.Any divergence of the price level P* from the
actual price level P,i.e. any positive or negative price gaps P* - P,
then suggests that the future price level will accelerate or slow
down. An application ofthis framework isto identifythe equilibrium
price level through the construction of P* and then to estimate
reduced-form short-run dynamics that drivethe actual pricelevel to
P* and thereby areconsistent with thelong-run constraints imposed
by P*. Such a short-run dynamic model of inflation is given by the
following error-correction model:
N
Ln(P,) = _lo_iALn(P)_,__ . + 13 (P,-I*" P,-,) (3)
The basic idea behind equations (2) and (3) therefore is that
any increase in thestock of moneywhich isnot accompanied byan
increase in real output, will cause an increase in P in the long-run.
In order to test this basic hypothesis for the Philippines, the P*
approach will be reformulated in terms of a multivariate
cointegration analysis following Funke and Hall.The first statement
which can bemade aboutthe approach isthatfor equation (3)to be
a valid representation of the data, P and P* must form a
cointegrating relationshipinthe sense of Engleand Granger (1987).60 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
When following the definition of the P* variable, we can now see
that this implies a very strong statement about the underlying
variables in the system.The logged analogue to equation (1) is:
V = P + Q- M (4)
•Thenwe can definethe equilibriumvelocityV* by producinga model
of V,
V = ._To+_/'Z+et (5)
where Z is a suitable set of variables that drive V,T is a vector of
parameters and et is an i.i.d (identically and independently-
distributed) error term.Then we can defineV* as
V * : _0 + _ ' Z I (6)
.i.e.V* is the forecast from:equation(5).Then P* •is-definedas
P* = V*+M-Q* (7)
•Nowwe know from cointegrationtheory.thatforequation (3)to be a
.valid model, the difference between P and P* must be.stationary,
• i.e.
P-P*= W. t . (8)
where wt must be .stationary.Now by substituting (7) into (8) and
using .(4)and (5),it iseasy to show thatREYES AND YAP: MONEY AND PRICES 61
W I = e, (9)
In other words, forw_to be stationary,etmust likewisebe stationary
and this impliesthat Z andV or Z, P,Q*,and Mform a cointegrating
set of variables.This implicationallowsthe questions of causality to
be addressed in a formaland satisfactory wayusing recentwork on
multivariate systems of cointegrated variables.The basic statistical
concepts are briefly introduced below. As a tentative data
generating process, consider the following four-dimensional k-th
order vector autoregressive (VAR)model with Gaussian errors
X_ = ro+ r_Xt. _+... + rkX_. k+ e, t=l .....T (10)
where Xt= [M, Q*, P,V*], r_ are 4x4 coefficient matrices, and et is a
4xl vector of independent and identically (normally) distributed
error terms. In empirical applications, the lag length k will be
specified enough for the residualsto be uncorrelated._Inthis form,
the model is based on minimal behavioral assumptions on the
economic phenomenon of interest.2Given that the model can be
accepted, we have a well defined statistical model for the data
generating process withinwhich economically interesting questions
on the long run behaviorcan beasked and tested in awell-defined
statistical framework. This then allows for a maximum likelihood
analysis if Gaussian errors are assumed. Because no assumption
is made at this stage on the specific form of the simultaneous
structure of the model, the approach also eliminates the single
1. In order to check whetherthe model (10) is an appropriate descriptionof the
data generatingprocess, the assumption of Gaussian error terms is tested in the
followingempirical work.
2. Note that there are no exogenousor endoge.nc_us variables and so we do not
make a priori assumptions about the exogeneityof some of the variables Jnthe
system.62 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
equation bias likely to have affected previous studies. The VAR
model in levelscan be reparameterizedin error correction form as
_Xt = ro+ "K1AXt. 1 Jr- "K2AXt. 2 -.}- '... + 7_k.lAXt.k+l + _k-Xt.k-.I- et (11)
where=_=-I+r l+...+r_, i= 1....,kand l is the identity matrix. =k
defines the long-run solution. Now, the heart of the Johansen
procedure is simplyto decomposethe matrix=kintotwo matrices
and p, both of which are 4 x r in dimensionsuch that
_k= eLI3' (12)
The rows of 13can be interpreted as the cointegrating relations
among the four nonstationaryvariablesandthe rowsof_zshow how
these cointegrating vectors are loaded into each equation in the
system. The loading matrix therefore effectively determines the
causality in the system, i.e.it allows us to test the direction in which
causality flows.Johansen (1988, 1991) gives a maximum likelihood
estimation technique for both matrices, and outlines suitable tests
on the number of distinct cointegrating vectors which exist as well
as on the hypothesis about the matrices. By testing 13,parameter
restrictions on the long-run properties of the data may be tested.
On the other hand, bytesting o_, the direction of causality within the
model may be tested.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Intheir analysis of German data, Funkeand Hallignore the use
of potential GNP,Q*, and focus solely on the more important role
played by V* because only long-run relationships are considered.
Consistent long-run data on P, M, and Q is not available in the
Philippines and this constrains us to use quarterly data from 1981-REYESAND YAP: MONEY AND PRICES 63
1992 in order to arrive at an adequate time series. This hardly
qualifies as a long-term period and thus an estimate of Q* is
required for our study
An initialstep is to examinethe behavior of velocity overtime in
order to derive a suitablemeasure of V* (Figures 1, la and 2, 2a).
Fromboth the annual data covering the period 1967-1992 and the
quarterly data, it is evident that the velocities of the two monetary
aggregates consideredfor our study have fluctuated considerably
However,the velocity of the broad monetary aggregate, V2, does
not indicate a trend especially when compared to V1, a measure
basedon MI. This distinctionismoreapparentin the caseof annual
data.
The reason for the difference in V1 and V2 lies mainly in the
behavior of demand forM1 andTL.There has been onlya relatively
marginal increase in M1since 1967,owing perhaps to the creation
of newfinancial instrumentsand the trend towardsautomation.The
demand for TL experienced faster growth following the rise in
income (currency is an inferior good) and the implementation of
financial liberalizationmeasures.Theabsence ofa trend provides a
relatively reliable long-run linkbetween the broad moneyaggregate
(labelled TL, for total liquidity) and the price level (Hallman et al.,
1989:841). A statistically more robust basis for the choice of TL is
presented later2
Equation 5 is estimated using OLS.4 A measure of financial
wealth as a ratio of nominalpotential GNP,capital stock as a ratioof
3, M1 consists of currency and demand deposits while TL includes M1 plus
savingsandtimedeposits anddepositsubstitutes.The latteris definedas markets
for additionalfundsbyfinancialintermediaries and includesinstruments suchas
dealer promissory notes,repurchaseagreements,and certificates of assignment.
In 1986,thecoverageofTLwas expanded toincludenationalgovernmentdeposits
with the Central Bank andthe transferof the assets of two government financial
Institutions to the nationalgovernment.
4. The estimation procedures werecarriedoutusingthe REG-Xsoftwarepackage
(version 92.6) developedby ProfessorStephen Hall of the London Business
School.64 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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Figure I
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Sourceof basicdata: National IncomeAccounts
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nominal potential GNP, and real GNP growth rate are used as
determinants forthe velocityofTL.A measure ofpotential GNP(Q*)
is obtained by first regressing actual GNP against a time variable,
PotentialGNPthen becomestheestimated GNPfromthis equation.
The estimate of V" is the predicted value from Equation 5. The
regression results are shown in Table 1.
i ,,,, --,, ,,,, ....
, v,
Table 1
ESTIMATES OF THE V* MODEL




Sample period: 1982:1 o1991:4
Rsquare = 0.90 DW = 1.45
DF = -4.64 ADF(4) = -2.16
Skewness = 0.96 Kurtosis = 4.12
Bera-Jarque = 8.29
where
PGNP = implicit price deflator for GNP
LTL = log (total liquidity)
LPGNP = log (PGNP)
LPOT = log (potential GNP)
P+Q*-M = LPGNP + LPOT - LTL
GNPR = GNP growth rate
LCS2 = log (capital stock/(PGNP*POTGNP)
LW2 = log (net domestic assets/(PGNP*POTGNP).REYES AND YAP: MONEY AND PRICES 67
All the explanatory variables are significant. (Alternative
specifications for P+Q*-M included either the nominal or the real
interest rate but the interest rates were found to be statistically
insignificant).TILediagnostic test statistics usedto test for normality
are skewness (centered on zero),kurtosis (centered on 3),and the
Bera-Jarque statistic which is distributed x2(2).The Bera-Jarque
statistic together with the measures of skewness and kurtosis do
not indicate non-normality.The exact critical values forthe Dickey-
Fullerand augmented Dickey-Fullertestsformodels with morethan
three variables are unknown, although Granger and Engle have
derived the critical values for models with 2 and 3 variables,The
results suggest that the variables do cointegrate.
To test for the number of cointegrating vectors, we apply
Johansen's maximum likelihood estimation and testing procedure
to the set of logged variables P, Q*, M, and V*. The results are
shown in Tables2 and 3.
II I I II IIII
Table 2
THE ESTIMATED UNRESTRICTED EIGENVECTORS
Importance P Q* M V*
1 1.0 1.5 -1.0 -0,98
2 1,0 1561 -251.22 -4218.3
3 1.0 -39.88 3.13 -1.04
4 1.0 -17.95 0.755 -0.286
II • II II I II I II
Table 3
TEST OF NUMBER OF DISTINCT COINTEGRATING VECTORS
Number of Asymptotic Small sample 95% Critical
vectors LR test LR test value
1 50,42 30.25 47,21
2 23,00 13,80 29,68
3 8.64 5,18 15,41
4 0.45 0,27 3,76REYESAND YAP:MONEY AND PRICES 69 ..
using an autoregressive model of order 2 to correct for
autocorrelation. Table 5 shows the results of regressing PGNP
against past, present, and future values of TL.The low t-statistics
associatedwith coefficients of futureTL indicate that prices do not
causemoney.Similarly,the lowt-statisticsof the coefficients of past
values of TL suggest that money does not cause prices.
IIIII I IIIII IIIII I I I
Table 5
RESULTSOF REGRESSIONOF PGNP ONTL
Variable Coefficient T-statlstic Significance _
TL -0.00013 -0.42 0,678
TL(-1) 0,00025 0.82 0.421
TL(-2) 0,00027 0,98 0.335
TL(-3) 0,00031 1,07 0,295
TL(-4) 0.00012 0,41 0.683
TL(1) 0.00018 -0,58 0.569
TL(2) -0.00014 -0.51 0,611
TL(3) -4.470D-05 -0,18 0.856
TL(4) 0,00013 0.5.1 0.612
Table6 shows the regressionofTL on past, present, and future
values of PGNP.Some of the coefficients are significant. However,
thejoint testof thesignificance of past values of PGNP indicates no
causality running from PGNP to TL (refer to Table7). Similarly,the
joint test of the significance of the futurevalues of PGNPsuggests
no causality running from TL to PGNP.Thus, there is no causality
between moneyand prices.
THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY FROM1981-1992
Following Hoover(1991), the interpretationof the empirical
resultsmustgo beyondthestatistical aspectsandalsoconsiderthe
institutional featuresof the economy.In thisway,one can explain70 JOURNAL ,OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT,. :. .... . .. _ , . ".. _.
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• 'Table6 .. . ._ .... -
RESULTS OF REGRESSION OF TLON .P.GNP. . ........
_=
Variable •Coefficient " T-statistic Significance
PGNP -1564.79 -1,68 " 0.104
PGNP(-1) 1557.02 1 65 . . 0,!12.
PGNP(-2) 120.18 0,13 " 0.901
PGNP(-3) 180.13 0,2,2 . 0,827
PGNP(-4) -567.25 -0,82 . O:419
PGNP(1 ) 270.94, . 0,2.9 "0.-774
PGNP(2) -i574.54 -1-.68, 0.105
PGNP(3) " 1384.88 i 731" 0.095•
PGNP(4) 2416.86 3.55' 0.001
il II Hill III I III
,. .... .. :
• Table 7 ..." . . • . ,,.., . . ".
RESULTS OF THE-GRANGER AND SIM'S TEST•
Equaton, . . . :. , . F ..., .. SSE.. • Partial Adjusted. DVV
: .. .. • . • " F R2 ".:... i:...":"
• • , . L...:- .. " "
TL=f(PGNP,4 past, 4 future). 20.97 : -•3324.716.. • 0_97 1.63
TL=f(PGNP, 4 future) 102.62 3819.661,. 0,48 . 0.89. 0.47
TL=f(PGNP, 4 past)• 42.19 5232.301 1.38 0,•91• " 0.91
TL=f(4 pa_t. 4 future) 24.33 •3348.149 ••• 0.18 0,•96 • " 1_73,REYESANDYAp: MONEY AND PRICES 71
the result that money and prices did not exhibit a significant
relationship during the period under the study
Table 8 summarizes various key events that characterized the
Philippine situation during the past twelveyears, highlighted bythe
end of the Marcos regime in early 1986.This series of crises and
natural calamities has taken its toll on the economy,which has not
experienced a period of sustained output growth. Because of the
rather delicate state of affairs,monetaryauthorities were always on
the defensive, reacting to the shocks that buffeted the economy,
rather than taking an active role in promoting a stable
macroeconomic environment. In what follows, we briefly describe
the different shocks during the period 1981 to 1992 and the policy
responses and institutional features that may have led to a
divergence in the behaviorof moneyand prices.
The first major crisis in this period was in the financial sector
when a wealthy businessman fled the country in 1981, leaving
millions of dollars in debt with various Philippine financial
institutions.This particular incidentwasrather ill-timedas it occurred
just as financial reforms,which were an offshoot of ajoint IMF-WB
study,were being implemented.The latterincluded the reduction of
specialization among banks, the introduction of the concept of
"Universal Banking," and the liberalization of interest rates. The
crisis shook the financial system and brought about massive
withdrawals by money market investors and bank depositors.The
Central Bankand two majorgovernmentfinancial institutions hadto
rescue many troubled financial establishments in order to restore
the public's confidence in the financial system.
Inthe following year,the internationalfinancialcrisistook place,
exposing the weakness of many countries which had borrowed
heavily in the international capital markets.The Philippines was not
spared the heavy costs of adjustment, especially since the bulk of
its external debt was owed by the public sector or government-
guaranteed. The economic crisis was exacerbated by political
uncertainties that followed the assassination of a prominentro
Table 8
MAJOR ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND POLICY RESPONSES IN THE PHILIPPINES
Period 1980-1982 1983-1985 1986-1990 1991-1992
• ... .. ..
External shock Oilpriceshock Stoppageof foreign Negotiateddebt Gulfwar
capital inflow reseheduling
•Recession. Capitalflight Resumed
• . multilateraland ¢_





Restdotedforeign outflowdue to o
"1'1
credit debt payment ;o
-r"
"o
Domestic shock DeweyDee Assassination of Takeover of Volcaniceruption, -o
financialcrisis Aquino Aquino energycrisis, m
govemment Presidential m o
elections <










Monetary policy. Highly Restrictive Expansionary in Tight,lower _:
expansionary deflationary, initialyears;tight realinterestrates o z
counter-cyclical highinterest withhighinterest dueto inflation ._
financial rates ratesin lateryears surprise,but >
liberalization recovery in 1992 z U
"o
30
R_a.f policy Counter-cyclical _nt_etionary, Initially Tight, cutback on _
concentratedon expansionary, operationand
debtserviceand in lateryears expenditures and




Tradeand. Beginningof Suspensionof Tradeliberalization Continued
in..d_,.US...t_ policy removalofQR's trade liberalization, slowlydepreciating liberalization,
taxation of peso in 1990 focus on AFTA,
tradeables, sharply ._
rationing of appreciating peso, c_
foreign exchange, emphasison
devaluation energy projectsTable8 continued ._
Period 1980-1982 1983-1985 1986-1990 1991-1992
Combined Slowgrowth, Deep economic Economic Recession,surge
effects inflation recession, recoveryupto of inflationin
high inflation 1989, 1991,inflowof
increasingcurrent "footlooseforeign
accountdeficits, capital





Private Unfavorable Collapseof Renewed Renewed z
response reducedsavings, business confidence confidence r- O
capital flight confidence initially, due to 11
but continued erratic behavior peaceful -o -r
investments in later years transitionof _
spurred by power, -o-°
government sharpdecline m





Note: Summaryof key eventsisbasedon Table3.1 of M. Lamberte, J. Lim,R. Vos,J. Yap,E.Tanand m
S.Zingapan, Philippine ExternalFinance, Domestic Mobilizationand Development in the 1970s z
and 1980s.Makati: Philippine Institutefor DevelopmentStudies, 1990. _REYES AND YAP: MONEY AND PRICES 75
opposition figure in 1983. During the next two years (1984-1985)
output fell by a combined 15 percent with inflation averaging 35
percent (Table 9). The monetary authorities contributed to the
recession by pursuing restrictive policies driving interest rates
upward and stifling domestic credit. The purpose of the tight
monetary policywas to stem the outflow of capital and to ease the
pressure on the exchange rate.
II I IIIIlll I II
Table 9
KEY MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS:
PHILIPPINES, 1981 - 1992
Real Output growth Inflation Interestrate Monetarygrowth
(GNP,percent) (PGNP,percent) (91-dayT-bill) (TL, percent)
1981 3.2 11.7 12.6 20,9
1982 2.6 8.7 13.8 16.4
1983 1,4 14.2 14.2 18.9
1984 -8.7 53.3 30,5 7.2
1985 -7.1 17.7 26.8 9.6
1986 4.1 2.9 14.4 13.7
1987 5.1 7.4 :11.4 11.3
1988 7.1 10.2 14.7 23.1
1989 5.7 8.7 18.6 25.8
1990 4.5 12.7 23,7 18.7
1991 0.2 17.0 21.4 14.3
1992 0.6 7.9 16.0 11.5
Sourceof basicdata:NationalIncomeAccounts and CentralBankof the Philippines,
Economicmanagementduringthe period 1986 to 1992 was
largely dominated by the management of the external debt
overhang.Net resourceoutflowstotalled$7.7 billionfrom 1986 to
1991asthecountry'sfinancialmanagersadheredtoa conservative
strategy to resolvethe debt crisis.Because of its accumulated
losses (which reached approximately$12 billionin 1992), the
Central Bank could not contributeeffectivelyto macroeconomic
stability. Partofthelossesweremonetized,leavingverylittleleewayREYES ANDYAP:MONEY AND PRICES 77
warranted by economic fundamentals, Inflationary expectations,
which are affected by the various crises and condition of
macroeconomic instability, alsoexertupwardpressureon prices.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The empiricalresultsshowthaton.balancethereisnocausality
between money and pricesin the Philippinesduringthe period
1981-1992.This relationship canbeexplainedbythe highlyerratic
political and economic environmentduring the same interval.
Anotherinterestingresultwhichwas notmentionedearlieristhat
the P* vectorhasnosignificance onpotentialoutput. Thiscouldbe
• explainedbythe useofQ*insteadofQ inthe estimation procedure,
withpotentialoutputbeingdeterminedbyeconomicfundamentals
outsidethe P* framework.78 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DE.VELOPMENT
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